• ICAO has condemned GNSS interference by Russia and North Korea, highlighting the growing threat to civil aviation and commercial airfreight, including jamming and spoofing that disrupt navigation, safety systems, and passenger services.
• Airlines and operators are adopting operational and technological mitigation measures, such as rerouting flights, crew training, multi-frequency receivers, controlled reception pattern antennas, and inertial navigation systems, to maintain safe operations despite interference.
• GNSS disruptions have wider supply chain and economic implications, affecting routing, fuel planning, autonomous aircraft, and cargo efficiency, prompting calls for resilient navigation technologies, standardised reporting, and coordinated industry-government responses.

The United Nations’ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adopted resolutions condemning interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) by Russia and North Korea, reaffirming the principle of interference-free civil aviation. The resolutions follow submissions to the International Telecommunication Union’s Radio Regulations Board in June by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, citing harmful interference affecting aircraft operating over the Baltic Sea.

GNSS interference incidents are increasingly reported outside conflict zones, affecting commercial operations and airfreight networks. Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance, said: “GNSS interference is not new, but its expansion beyond conflict zones is creating operational challenges for civil aviation and commercial markets.” She explained that jamming and spoofing events can impact multiple aircraft systems, requiring flight crews to intervene.

A September 2024 OpsGroup report documented incidents where spoofing disrupted navigation, enhanced ground proximity warning, and passenger Wi-Fi systems. The report noted that restoring accurate position data can require full system resets. Dyer emphasised that jamming devices are indiscriminate: “Most are cheap and broad, blasting signals in every direction. They do not distinguish between military and civil aircraft.”

The ICAO resolutions encourage states to improve monitoring and information-sharing of GNSS interference and to consider mitigation measures. Dyer said operators can integrate multiple strategies, including multi-frequency receivers and specialised antennas: “Introducing additional frequencies into receivers and integrating controlled reception pattern antennas can reduce vulnerability to both jamming and spoofing events.”

Experts warn that GNSS interference is increasingly linked to hybrid warfare tactics. Dyer noted: “In June 2025, Russia acknowledged jamming operations affecting civil receivers in the Baltic Sea and indicated they would continue due to military concerns.” She added that proactive technical and operational measures are critical to ensure uninterrupted navigation. “Civil aviation relies on redundancy, but these incidents show we cannot assume safety without active countermeasures,” Dyer said.

Operational risks and industry responses

Airlines and airfreight operators are adjusting operations to mitigate GNSS interference. Changes include rerouting flights, increasing communication with air traffic control, and ensuring crews are trained to recognise and respond to spoofing or jamming events. Dyer said: “Every aircraft is different, but some systems can experience cascading effects when spoofed, affecting navigation, safety, and even in-flight passenger services.”

Rerouting introduces fuel and schedule costs, with implications for the broader supply chain. Dyer explained: “Using GNSS allows operators to follow the most efficient route. Deviating due to interference increases operating costs, which pass through to shippers and consumers.” She highlighted the unpredictability of interference patterns: “Interference does not respect conflict zones. Civil and commercial operations in the Arctic, Baltic, or Mediterranean can be affected regardless of the presence of local hostilities.”

Technological mitigation is under development. Some carriers are exploring how to integrate multi-frequency receivers and controlled reception pattern antennas to reduce exposure to targeted interference.

“Tests show combining these technologies dramatically increases resilience to jamming and spoofing,” Dyer said. The use of inertial navigation systems alongside GNSS provides additional redundancy.

Air traffic controllers are also a key line of defence. Dyer noted that while crews can contact control towers to resolve issues, staff shortages and high workloads could complicate responses. “All public safety personnel are highly focused, but interference adds complexity to their operations,” she said. “With proper integration of technology and training, the industry can operate safely even in affected airspace,” Dyer added.

Supply chain and sector implications

GNSS interference also affects cargo logistics and the emerging use of autonomous aircraft. Dyer said autonomous systems without human oversight may be especially vulnerable: “For autonomous aircraft operating beyond visual line of sight, spoofing can create additional hazards, as these systems rely entirely on accurate navigation data.”

Industry groups are developing multi-band satellite systems and low Earth orbit positioning technologies operating in different frequencies to provide alternative navigation signals. Dyer explained: “If jammers are focused on L-band GNSS signals, using systems transmitting in additional bands, such as C-band allows navigation continuity, similar to how inertial and GPS systems complement each other.”

Operational disruptions can affect route selection, fuel planning, and transit times. Dyer emphasised the broader economic impact: “Even small interference incidents add cost across supply chains, reducing efficiency in both passenger and cargo operations.” She called on governments to support resilient navigation technologies and enforce measures against deliberate interference.

Looking ahead, ICAO expects expanded monitoring, standardised reporting, and collaborative mitigation measures. Dyer concluded: “The aviation sector cannot rely on an accident to trigger action. Redundant systems and skilled crews are essential, but integrating technological resilience now is critical to prevent incidents.”